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Abstract. While online social networks have become an important
channel for social interactions, they also raise ethical and privacy is-
sues. A well known fact is that social networks leak information, that
may be sensitive, about users. However, performing accurate real world
online privacy attacks in a reasonable time frame remains a challenging
task. In this paper we address the problem of rapidly disclosing many
friendship links using only legitimate queries (i.e., queries and tools pro-
vided by the targeted social network). Our study sheds new light on the
intrinsic relation between communities (usually represented as groups)
and friendships between individuals. To develop an ecient attack we
analyzed group distributions, densities and visibility parameters from
a large sample of a social network. By eectively exploring the target
group network, our proposed algorithm is able to perform friendship
and mutual-friend attacks along a strategy that minimizes the number
of queries. The results of attacks performed on active Facebook proles
show that 5 dierent friendship links are disclosed in average for each
single legitimate query in the best case.
Keywords: Online Social Network (OSN), Link disclosure attacks, Pri-
vacy
1 Introduction
A social network can be dened as a website that allows users to create personal
pages in order to share information with their friends and acquaintances. These
pages are usually called proles and contain personal information. Proles are
connected to each other through friendship links that can be either symmetric
or asymmetric, depending on the network's policy. Since their appearance at
the end of the twentieth century, social networks have known an outstanding
success and have become a global phenomenon. For instance, Facebook connects
about 25% of humans in 20161 and YouTube served videos to almost one-third
∗ This work is funded by Fondation MAIF.
1 http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-
users-worldwide/
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of all connected people on the Internet2. With this rapid network expansion, new
scientic elds have emerged such as online social network analysis [8] creating a
common domain of interest from sociology to mathematics and computer science
[7]. However, the emergence of social networks is also giving reasons to worry
about privacy and ethics issues [11].
In order to mimic real (i.e., non-cybernetical) societal interactions, some
social networks such as Facebook, Linkedin and Viadeo support the creation of
groups besides the prole creation. Accordingly, social networks can be modeled
by two types of graphs  friendship graph and group membership graph  as
depicted by Figure 1.
Fig. 1: Social graphs : (a) unipartite friendship graph, (b) bipartite group mem-
bership graph.
The friendship graph (a) is unipartite and models the friendship links between
users while membership graph (b) is bipartite and models the membership links
between users and groups. Some of these links can be masked by users or group
administrators. We call a friendship (resp. membership) attack a sequence of
actions (e.g., queries) leading to disclose a masked friendship (resp. membership)
link. Both kind of attacks are called link disclosure attacks. A mutual-friend
attack discloses common friends to a target and other users. We call group
uncovering attack a sequence of queries that disclose the membership network
of the target and his acquaintances. In this work the attacker is limited to the
usage of legitimate and minimal queries provided by the social networks APIs.
Therefore the attacker model can be viewed as a passive one. We believe that
these constraints are the cornerstones of successful real-world attacks that are
dicult to detect because the trac appears to be legitimate at rst.
In [3] researchers propose a Partial Graph Prole Inference (PGPI) algorithm
that exploit group memberships to infer proles attributes. In [10], relational
learning approaches and group memberships are used to infer sensitive attribute
of users such as locations.
Our experiments over 1,000 active Facebook proles hiding their friend lists
show that in the worst case 2 queries (in average) are sucient to disclose at
2 https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/en/statistics.html
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least one friendship link and 5 dierent friendship links are disclosed in average
by each query in the best case.
To put the rest of the paper into context, we start by dening problematics
and objectives of link disclosure attacks on Online Social Networks in Section 2.
Then we analyse groups distribution, densities and visibility parameters in Sec-
tion 3. Those properties are then used to perform group uncovering attack as
detailed in Section 4. In Section 5 we depict membership, friendship and mutual-
friend attacks steps and we analyse their results. Finally, in Section 6 we give
more detail about the resulting dataset of the attacks performed online.
2 Problematics and objectives
Problematics. In online attacks, the attacker is constrained by the network
dynamicity and the time needed to scrap it. In fact, the dynamical network
structure, with the addition/deletion of new links and nodes will ensure that the
sampled graph does not reect a real online social network at any given time.
Therefore, crawling tasks for online attacks must be highly selective to collect
only useful proles and information and be as fast as possible.
For instance, [5] show that homophilic attributes have signicant inuence
on predicting friendship between users of Facebook. Thus, an attacker may be
tempted to sweep the network for similar proles to his target. He can also con-
sider the friends of the target friends as potential friends and check these links.
Although these general solutions may seem eective to gather many potential
friends, they have major shortcomings. To understand these shortcomings let
us recall the "six degrees of separation" phenomenon, that is the possibility to
connect any two people in a maximum of six relationship steps. For example,
the authors of [1] show that the average degree of separation between Twitter
users is 3.43 while the degree of separation on Facebook is between 2.9 and 4.2
for the majority of users [4]. Hence, considering friends of friends as potential
friends is equivalent to considering at least tens of thousands users as potential
friends for each single target [9]. This is clearly impossible to handle and scale
for real-world ecient attacks.
Objectives. Link disclosure attacks in online social networks aim to disclose
hidden links by performing authorized requests. The attacks either reveal exist-
ing links or potential ones according to the employed method. In this work we
aim to improve the accuracy of the attacks. We aim to disclose numerous links
without having to verify a huge number of potential friends. In other words, we
attempt to gather many potential friends but only those who have high prob-
ability to be friend with the target. The best way to achieve our objectives is
to disclose the vicinity network of the target. To that end, we analyse groups'
properties on online social networks since they reect the way users are gathering
within a network and uncover its structure. To keep our discussion simple, we
aim to answer two questions in this work: Which groups leak useful information
to meet previously detailed objectives? And how to nd and use them?
4
3 Social networks group properties
In this section we analyse some properties of Facebook groups. This analysis
will guide crawling tasks in order to collect only data that leak more informa-
tion about the target. Exploiting such data will increase the accuracy of link
disclosure attacks and maximize the number of disclosed links. We stress that
all experiments in this work were carried out online with real Facebook proles.
We have crawled 1,100 Facebook groups and all their members. Then, we have
sorted the groups by declared size in sets. Each set contains at least 30 groups.
Each group in the rst set S0 gathers between 2 and 10 members. And each
group in the set Si gathers between 10i and 10(i+ 1) members.
3.1 Group distribution
We rst study the distribution of groups in Facebook with regard to their sizes.
We notice that the declared group size on this network is often dierent from
the number of users published on the group member list. Moreover, crawling
the same group using dierent IP addresses and accounts can result in slightly
dierent listed members. This technique can reduce the gap between the two
sizes by considering the union of all crawled member lists of the same group.
However, it adds more complexity to attacks. To study groups distribution we
have simulated a simple attack carried out using only one attacker node. All
groups are crawled only once and we only rely on the declared group size to
build the attack strategy.
Figure 2 shows that there are many more small groups on Facebook than
larger ones. However, we notice the curve inection for groups declaring between
30 and 70 members. By checking these groups members lists we notice huge gaps
between declared sizes and the numbers of listed members. Gaps reach 85% for
some groups. Some groups are declared to have 60 members or more but they
actually display less than 20 members on their members lists. These gaps can
be explained by the fact that users unceasingly leave and join the group but size
updates are not performed instantaneously. Henceforth, densities of such groups
can increase if real sizes decrease since the less connected members are usually
the rst ones to leave the groups.
The result of our tests carried on 14,517 Facebook proles shows that the
probability of a given Facebook user to join at least one group gathering less
than 50 members and publish his membership to it is 0.49. Thus, about half of
analysed Facebook proles are exposed to the danger of friendship link disclosure
through groups they join and that gathers less than 50 members .
3.2 Group densities
In an undirected social graph, a friendship link between two user is considered
public if at least one of them publishes it. It is considered hidden only if both
users hide it.
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Fig. 2: Group distribution of a sample of 14,517 Facebook users.
In order to guide a strategy for disclosing hidden social links we rst try to
evaluate the probability that two members of a group are friends. We dene three
notions of group densities: public density, real density and maximal density, that
we will use to estimate the number of friends that can be disclosed through link
disclosure attacks. Given a group g, PD(g) stands for its Public Density, RD(g)
stands for its Real Density and MD(g) stands for its Maximal Density. The
public density of g is the ratio of published friendship links between its members
to all possible friendship links between them. It is dened by Equation (1) where
|g| is the number of members of g:
PD(g) =
2
|g|(|g| − 1)
∑
{m,m′}⊆g
publicLink(m,m′) (1)
The real density of g is the ratio of all (public and hidden) friendship links
between its members to all possible friendship links between them. It is greater
or equal to the public density. It is dened by Equation (2)
RD(g) = PD(g) +
2
|g|(|g| − 1)
∑
{m,m′}⊆g
hiddenLink(m,m′) (2)
The maximal density of g can be met only if all its members who hide their
friend lists are friend with each other. It is greater or equal to the real density. It
is dened by Equation (3) where p is the percentage of members who hide their
friend lists among the members of g.
MD(g) = PD(g) +
p2|g| − p
|g| − 1
(3)
Thus we have:
PD(g) ≤ RD(g) ≤MD(g) (4)
Test results show that among 14,517 crawled Facebook proles only 6,249
(43%) hide their friend lists or choose to reveal them only to their direct friends,
friends of friends or some selected users. The rest (57%) leave the visibility
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setting by default and publish their friend lists. Hence, p can be considered
equal to 0.43 if it is unknown by the attacker. Note that the attacker can easily
verify the friend list visibility parameters of other users through the following
Facebook request:
/ < nid_u > /friends (5)
where nid_u is the numeric id 3 of the User u. In fact, this request returns the
friend list of the User u if and only if he publishes it.
Figure 3 (a) shows that group densities decrease as the declared size of the
group increases. It can be noticed that one can even estimate a given group
density only from its declared size. This information is precious as it determines
the number of links that can be disclosed between group members. In fact, the
group real density can be viewed as the probability of the friendship link between
a given member and another member from the same group. Hence, if the attacker
discloses group membership of his Target t to a Group g, then all other members
of g can be considered as potential friends of t with a probability in interval
[PD(g);MD(g)]. Knowing the declared size of g, PD(g) can be directly deduced
from Figure 3 (a) and MD(g) can be deduced from Equation (3). For instance,
the average public density of groups gathering between 10 and 20 members is
0.343. Then, according to Equation (3) the real density of such groups belongs
to interval [0.343; 0.515] for p equal to 0.43. Expressively, the estimated accuracy
of link disclosure attack is 0.343 and all the members of corresponding groups
can be considered as potential friends with probability in [0.343; 0.515].
Although popular groups gather many members, probabilities of friendship
between them are very low. Crawling such groups is fruitful to seek a lot of
potential friends of the target but with low probabilities. However, minute groups
open small horizon for potential friends but with higher probability of friendship.
The relationship status between two members of a group g is a binary vari-
able. Hence, assuming independance of friendship links in a rst approximation,
the expected number of published friendship links between a given member and
all other members of the same group is the expectation of a binomial distribu-
tion of parameters B(|g|, PD(g)) which is |g|×PD(g). For example, Figure 3 (a)
shows that the expected public density of groups gathering less than 11 members
is greater than 35%. Hence, the expected number of friends of a target within a
group he joins and that gather 6 members is 2 (since 0.35×6 = 2.1). Figure 3(b)
shows that the expected number of disclosed links between the target and group
members slightly increases as the declared size of groups increases. Note that
x-axis unit correspond to 10 members and y-axis unit correspond to 1 friendship
link.
3.3 Group visibility parameters
Groups and members can independently choose to publish or hide the member-
ship relation. For instance Facebook users can choose to mask some groups from
3 Numeric id can be acquired through http://findmyfbid.in/
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their list of groups. On the other hand, the administrators of groups can inde-
pendently publish the entire lists of members. With that in mind, an attacker
can build an attack strategy to disclose the groups that are masked by users or
the membership lists of secret groups.
Fig. 3: Results of analysis: (a) Variation of public density with respect to group
declared size, (b) Expected number of disclosed links between the target and
group members.
4 Group uncovering attacks
In this section we exploit groups properties detailed in previous section to per-
form group uncovering attacks. To that end, we dene real and public n-hop
distant groups.
4.1 Real n-hop distant groups
Given a target t that joins Group g, g is considered as a real 1-hop distant
group from t (denoted by g ∈ RG1(t)) and all its members m are considered
as real 1-hop distant members from t (denoted by m ∈ RM1(t)). We dene
inductively g ∈ RGn(t) i g 6∈ RGn−1(t) and there is g′ ∈ RGn−1(t) with a
non-empty intersection with g. For all m in g \RMn−1(t) we have by denition
m ∈ RMn(t). We can show the following symmetry rule:
u1 ∈ RMn(u2) ⇐⇒ u2 ∈ RMn(u1) (6)
where u1 and u2 are two dierent users. Figure 4 depicts an example of a real
3-hop distant group from the target node t.
Group g1 is a real 1-hop distant group from t. Consequently, all its members
are real 1-hop distant members from t. Members m6, m7, m8, m9 and m10 are
real 2-hop distant members from t since they join the same Group g2 as m5 who
is real 1-hop distant members from t. Finally, m11, m12, m13 and m14 are real
3-hop distant members from t as m9 and m10 join their Group g3. Members
m5, m10 and m9 act as gateway between groups.
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Fig. 4: g3 is a real 3-hop distant group from t.
4.2 Public n-hop distant groups
Users can mask their membership to groups and groups can hide their mem-
bers lists. Consequently, the public n-hop distant relation does not satisfy the
symmetry rule.
Fig. 5: An example of public n-hop distant groups and members.
Figure 5 depicts an example of dierent public n-hop distant groups and
members between two users. Arrows from user to groups stand for membership
links while arrows on the opposite direction represent group members lists. Dot-
ted lines represent masked links and solid lines represent public links. While both
Users u1 and u2 join the same group g1, only u1 publishes his membership to g1.
User u2 publishes only his membership to Group g2. User u3 acts as a gateway
between g2 and g3 and publishes his membership to both of them. All groups
g1, g2 and g3 publish their member lists. There are two public paths from User
u1 to User u2. The rst one, the green path, goes through g1 and is the shortest
one with only one hop. The second one, the blue path, is two hops long. It goes
through g3 then g2. Hence, u2 is a public 1-hop distant member from u1. On
the other hand, there is only one public path, the red path, from u2 to u1 that
goes through g2 then g3. Thus, u1 is a public 2-hop distant member from u2.
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4.3 Social graph traversal algorithm
Let u2 be a target user who is friend with both users u1 and u3 and hides his
friend list. Since he publishes his membership to g2, the attacker can reach u3
through g2 member list. And if u3 publishes his friend list, the attacker can
easily disclose the friendship link between u3 and u2 by checking the friend
list of u3. Likewise, the attacker can reach u1 through g3 member list if u3
publishes his membership to that group. And he can search for u2 in u1 public
friend list. Furthermore, next hop lead to g1 and hence the attacker can disclose
group membership links between u2 and g1 by checking g1 public member list.
Algorithm 1 gives more details about the graph traversal steps. The algorithm
outputs are two sets of groups and members. And its inputs are the number of
hops and a set of seed groups of the target.
Data: gps: set of groups, h: number of hops
Result: dm: set of distant members, dg: set of distant groups
1 Procedure explore(gps, h, dg, dm)
2 if (h > 0) then
3 for each g ∈ gps do
4 members.addAll(getMembers(g)) ;
5 end
6 members.removeAll(dm);
7 for each m ∈ members do
8 groups.addAll(getPublicGroups(m)) ;
9 end
10 groups.removeAll(dg);
11 dg.addAll(groups);
12 dm.addAll(members);
13 explore(groups, h− 1, dg, dm);
14 end
15 Return()
Algorithm 1: Groups uncovering attack through social graph traversal
To collect seed groups, the attacker can directly retrieve unmasked groups
from his target prole. We note that among 14,517 attacked Facebook proles
11,446 (78.84%) do not change group visibility parameters and publish their
groups membership even to secret groups. Otherwise, if the target masks all his
groups and attributes, the attacker can create a fake virgin prole, use it to
only visit his target prole, send him friendship request and try to interact with
him by liking and commenting his posts or sending him messages. Then, link
prediction algorithms of the social network [2] will start suggesting groups and
attributes to the attacker that are strongly related to his target. Hence, he can
use the suggested groups as seeds or take advantage of network research features
and uses suggested attributes to look for seed groups. For instance, one of this
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paper author hides all his attributes on Facebook. However, the social network
suggested his home town and 10% of his friends to a newly created prole that
he added as a friend.
By following Algorithm 1 steps the attacker can eectively crawl his target
group network and avoid loops. However, some social networks do not allow
robots to crawl their network. For instance, Facebook bans robot accounts for a
week. To overcome this issue, we used many users accounts. Our robot is able to
change IP adresses, simulate human behaviour, switch between accounts, manage
connection loss and save data in XML format and SQL database to avoid loops
and replay attacks oine.
5 Link disclosure attacks
In this section we exploit the group uncovering attack detailed in previous section
to perform link disclosure attacks. We aim to disclose two types of link: friendship
between users and membership between users and groups.
5.1 Friendship and membership attacks
The attacker can explore the group networks of his target then check the mem-
ber lists of distant groups to disclose group membership links to the masked
groups. However, results show that less than 0.1 group membership in average
can be disclosed by this attack. This can be explained by the fact that 78.84%
of attacked proles do not change group visibility parameters and even publish
their memberships to secret groups. On the other hand, by exploring groups
networks of 14,517 proles we disclosed 430 dierent secret groups and 756 of
their members. Secret groups can help to disclose communities if their member
lists are disclosed. Moreover, their members can be taken into consideration to
compute the probability of friendship between two users who hide their friend
lists.
In this work we aim to disclose friendship links with certainty. In undirected
social networks it is sucient but not necessary that one of the two friends pub-
lishes his friend list to disclose the friendship link between them with certainty.
In this perspective, an attacker can query all friend lists of the distant groups
members of the target and check if he is listed in public ones. Opportunely, some
social networks aord features that can be used to rapidly check friendships be-
tween users. For instance, friendship between two users of Facebook can be easily
checked through the following PHP request (7):
/friendship/ < nid1 > / < nid2 > (7)
Where < nid1 > and < nid2 > are numeric IDs of two dierent users. In
fact, the request (7) returns the date of the link creation between two users if
and only if there is a friendship link between them and at least one of them
publishes his friend list. Taking advantage of this feature, attacker can easily
11
follow Algorithm 2 to disclose both friendship and group membership links of
his target. Algorithm inputs are the prole of the target, the number of hops
and the minimum number of links to disclose.
Data: t: target prole, h: number of hops, th: disclosed link threshold
Result: df : set of disclosed friends, dig: set of disclosed groups
1 seedGroups ← getSeedGroups(t);
2 sizeSort(seedGroups); . list of set of groups sorted by size
3 while df .size() < th & seedGroups.length()>0 do
4 dm2.addAll(dm); . dm2 contains all tested proles
5 dg.clear(); dm.clear();
6 explore(seedGroups.pop(), h, dg, dm); . see algorithm 1
7 dm.removeAll(dm2); . remove already tested proles
8 for each m ∈ dm do
9 if friendship(m, t) then
10 df .add(m);
11 end
12 end
. all newly explored groups are not tested yet
13 for each g ∈ dg do
14 if getMembers(g).contains(t) then
15 dig.add(g);
16 end
17 end
18 end
Algorithm 2: Friendships and group membership attacks based on k-hop
group graph traversal
We have attacked more than 100 active Facebook proles that hide their
friend lists from each set detailed in Section 3. For each attack we only checked
the groups belonging to the same set to disclose friendship links between the
target and those groups members. Note that users can be members of many
groups from the same set. Since tiny groups densities are higher than large ones,
fewer requests are required to disclose friendship links with certainty between the
former members than between the latter members. 1-hop attack results (Figure
9 (a), blue curve) show that the average number of required requests to disclose
one link with certainty increases as the size of groups increases. Only 6 requests
in average are sucient to disclose a friendship link with certainty of a target
joining groups gathering less than 40 members against more than 7 requests in
average for larger groups. However, the average number of requests to disclose
one friendship link decreases if attacks involve 2-hop distant groups from the
target. This does not mean that the ratio of published friendship links (PFLs),
between the target and 2-hop distant groups members from him, is higher than
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the ratio of PFLs between the target and 1-hop distant groups members from
him. But, the ratio of PFLs between the target and the union of both 1-hop and
2-hop distant groups members from him is higher than any of the two ratios.
Fig. 6: 2-hop friendship disclosure attack.
Observations. Figure 6 gives an illustration of an observed social phenom-
ena. Users within the same network tend to crowd in small and highly overlap-
ping groups. Thereby, small networks pop up within big networks. To put it in
another way, some members joining the same group (e.g., g1) decide to create
a new group (e.g., g2) of similar size and to add some of their acquaintances
to it. And so they act as gateways between both groups (inclined nodes in Fig-
ure 6). Some newly added members to the latter group (e.g., u3) publish their
friendship links to the former group members. Therefore, the ratio of published
friendship links between the target t and all members of the two merged groups
(e.g., 3/14 for g1∪ g2) is greater than the ratio of published friendship links be-
tween him and any of the two groups taken alone (e.g., 2/11 for g1 and 1/11 for
g2). And consequently, the average number of requests to disclose one friendship
link decreases as well as the number of disclosed links increases.
However, Figure 9 (a) shows that 3-hop attacks are less eective than 2-
hop attacks. This result can be explained by the fact that the ratio of members
publishing their friendship to the target among 3-hop distant groups is low.
On the one hand, crawling those groups may orient the attack toward adjacent
networks and dramatically increase the number of requests to disclose one link
in average. On the other hand, it may disclose masked groups of the target.
With this in mind, attackers can perform 3-hop or above attacks to only disclose
masked groups of the target by checking public member lists then perform 2-
hop attacks to disclose friendship links. Moreover, they can reduce the size of
attacked groups after each hop to avoid crawling adjacent networks. Thus, they
can eectively uncover the group network of the target and minimize the number
of requests to disclose friendship links.
5.2 Mutual-friend attacks
The term 'mutual friends' stands for friends in common between two users.
Mutual-friend attacks are performed between the target who hides his friend list
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and another user to disclose a list of friends in common between them. In this
section we exploit group uncovering attacks to perform mutual-friend attacks [6]
between two members of the same network. Attacker can take advantage of the
features aorded by social networks in order to list public mutual friends of two
users. For instance, mutual friends of two Facebook users can be rapidly listed
through the following Facebook request (8):
/browse/mutual_friends/?uid =< nid1 > &node =< nid2 > (8)
Where < nid1 > and < nid2 > are the numeric IDs of two dierent users.
Thus, the attacker can follow Algorithm 2 steps while replacing lines from 8
to 17 by the function described by Algorithm 3 to disclose mutual-friend links
between his target and other users. Similarly to Algorithm 2, this algorithm
inputs are the target prole, the number of hops and the minimum number
of links to disclose. But it discloses mutual friends between the target and the
groupe members rather than friendships between them.
1 for each m ∈ dm do
2 df .addAll(mutualFriends(m, t));
3 end
Algorithm 3: Mutual friend attack
In fact, a mutual-friend request (8) between two users returns the list of their
mutual friends that publish their friend list if and only if at least one of the two
given users publishes his friend list as well. Starting from the hypothesis that
a mutual-friend attack is performed between the target who hides his friend
list and another user, it is only successful if both the latter and the mutual
friend publish their friend list. Moreover, it is not eective in the case of sparse
networks since it does not disclose friendship link between two users that do not
have mutual friends even if one of them publishes his friend list. The example
depicted by Figure 7 shows that despite the fact that User u1 publishes his friend
list, mutual-friend requests cannot disclose the friendship link between him and
the target t. Dotted arrows represent masked links and solid ones represent
Fig. 7: Undisclosed links by mutual-friend attack.
public links. In this example only User u1 publishes his friend list and both
User u2 and the target t hide theirs. Hence, the results of all possible mutual-
friend requests between Users u1, u2 and t are empty since two of them hide
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their friend list. However, friendship requests can disclose the friendship links
between the target t and User u1 and between Users u1 and u2. Figure 8 depicts
the average number of undisclosed links by a mutual-friend attack but disclosed
by a friendship attack. We notice that this number increases with the number
of hops.
Fig. 8: The average number of undisclosed links by mutual-friend attack but
disclosed by friendship attack.
Having said that, mutual-friend attacks can disclose more friends than friend-
ship attacks if the target shares many mutual friends with his distant members.
Figure 9 (b) shows that the number of mutual-friend requests to disclose one
friendship link is quite similar for 1-hop and 2-hop attacks and increases for
3-hop attacks. However, it is far lower than the number of friendship requests
depicted by Figure 9 (a) as mutual-friend request returns a list of friends.
To get better results the attacker can combine both attacks. For instance to
maximize the number of disclosed links, he can sequentially perform a friendship
attack after a mutual-friend attack. Hence, the number of attack requests will
be equal to 2n − d where n is the number of distant groups members and d
is the number of disclosed links between the target and them by mutual-friend
attacks. Besides, he can alternatively perform both attacks to disclose friendship
links between the target and his distant groups members. He can then follow
Algorithm 2 steps while replacing lines from 8 to 17 by Algorithm 4 in order to
focus his attack on distant groups members. Thus, the number of attack requests
will belong to interval [2; 2n]. In fact, if mutual-friend requests do not disclose
any friendship links between the target and his distant groups members then the
number of attack requests will be equal to 2n, by adding n friendship requests
and n mutual-friend requests. On the other hand, if the target network is highly
connected and the rst mutual-friend request between the target and one of his
distant groups members returns the rest of distant groups members then the
number of attack requests will be 2, namely one friendship request and only one
mutual-friend request.
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1 for each m ∈ dm do
2 if (!df .contains(m)) then
3 if (friendship(m, t)) then
4 df .add(m);
5 end
6 end
7 df .addAll(mutualFriends(m, t));
8 if (df .containsAll(dm)) then
9 break;
10 end
11 end
Algorithm 4: Mutual friend and friendship attacks
Fig. 9: Results of attacks: (a) The average number of friendship request to disclose
one friendship link, (b) The average number of mutual-friend request to disclose
one friendship link
Fig. 10: Sample of 14,517 facebook proles: (a) Frequency of published group
membership, (b) Frequency of list of friends size.
6 Dataset
We have performed online attacks on Facebook. We have crawled 14,517 pro-
les, 22,855 groups and 76,772 mutual-friend lists. The resulting graph con-
tains 4,153,379 user nodes, 131,410 group nodes, 5,720,973 friendship links and
1,225,533 group membership links. We noticed that 78.84 % of crawled proles
do not mask their groups 56.95 % publish their friend lists and 47.77 % publish
16
both. Among users who publish their friend list, the number of friends for a
user in average is 530. And among all crawled proles the number of unmasked
groups for a user in average is 14.17. Figure 10 depicts the frequencies of pub-
lished groups per user (a) and number of friends (b).
7 Conclusion
Friendship links on social networks hold sensitive information about the com-
munity structure and anity between users. Disclosing them can expose users
to the highest danger of leaking personal sensitive information such as political
orientation. In this paper we have tackled the problem of link disclosure with cer-
tainty. We have performed online attacks on active Facebook proles and proved
that attackers can easily and rapidly disclose many hidden links with certainty
taking advantage of social network APIs.
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